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THE SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE IGBOS'S INDIFFERENTISM 
ST TH

IN THE AUGUST 1  TO 10  2024 END BAD GOVERNANCE NATIONAL PROTEST: 
A COUNTER PROTEST, A POLITICAL REACTION OR MISTRUST FOR 

NATIONAL UNITY?

Barnabas Ekiegini Izegede
University of Delta, Agbor 

barnabas.izegede@unidel.edu.ng

ABSTRACT 

The extent to which ethnic nationalities are able to effectively manage the interplay of ethnic 
differences determines to what extent a multi-ethnic nation develops without crises. Ethnicity in 
Nigeria, is a product of inequality among the various ethnic groups orchestrated by a long period 
of colonialism; a period which witnessed the ascendancy of ethnic groups to the socio-political 
domination of other ethnic groups and a period when the ethnic groups were used as a pedestal for 
the distribution of socio-political goods, resulting in the inability of other ethnic groups to access 
these socio-political goods. This paper examines the socio-political implications of the Igbos' 
indifferentism towards the August 1  -10 , 2024  in st th

#End Bad Governance National Protest
Nigeria. The Igbos' lack of enthusiasm for the protest raises questions about their stance on 
national unity and governance. This study reveals that historical marginalization, perceived 
exclusion, and fear of political manipulation contribute to the Igbos' indifferentism. The 
implications of this indifferentism include mistrust in national unity, regionalization of politics, 
weakened national cohesion, and further political marginalization. This research highlights the 
need for inclusive governance and addressing ethnic grievances to promote national unity and 
stability. 

Keywords: Igbos, indifferentism, national protest, bad governance, socio-political implications, 
national unity, Nigeria. 

INTRODUCTION 

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed a period of unforeseen socio-political and 
economic instability as well as bloodshed. This is partly due to the petty- bourgeois origins of 
Nigerian nationalism and the politicization of ethnicity in the polity. Like the national formations 
on the Indian subcontinent, the political formation of Nigeria came into being alongside several 
contextual socio-economic and political factors; the fear of domination, economic exploitation, 
social and sometimes religious discrimination (Awoshakiu, T. 2002). These and others have not 
only set the tone for socio-economic and political underdevelopment, but have also set the 
various ethnic groups against each other. The recent national protest in Nigeria has brought to the 
fore the complex dynamics of ethnic relations and national unity. The #End Bad Governance 

st thNational Protest, scheduled for August 1  – 10 , 2024, aims to address the pervasive issues of 
corruption, mismanagement, and ineptitude plaguing Nigeria. However, the Igbos, a significant 
ethnic group in the country, have exhibited indifferentism towards the protest. This lack of 
enthusiasm is puzzling, given the protest's objectives align with Igbos' long-standing grievances 
against the Nigerian state. This article delves to unravel the socio-political implications of the 
Igbos' indifferentism, exploring the historical, cultural, and political factors contributing to their 
stance. 

By examining the Igbos' indifferentism, this research aims to provide insights into the 

39



complexities of Nigerian politics, the challenges of national unity, and the nuances of ethnic 
relations in the country. By examining the past, we can better understand the present and the 
implications for national unity. 

BACKGROUND 

Historical experiences, including the Biafran War and marginalization, have contributed to the 
Igbos mistrust in national unity. Their indifferentism may stem from a perceived lack of 
commitment to addressing their concerns, leading to skepticism about the protest's effectiveness. 

(a)The Biafran War: A Legacy of Trauma 

The 1967-1970 Biafran War left an indelible mark on the Igbo people. The devastating conflict 
resulted in massive loss of millions of Igbo lives, displacement, and economic devastation. The 
trauma of this period has been passed down through generations, shaping the Igbos' perception of 
Nigerian politics. The Nigerian Civil War – also commonly referred to as the Biafran War – took 
place from 1967 to 1970 with estimates ranging from one million to six million people killed 
(Oduah, 2017). The civil war is widely understood as a conflict between the secessionist state of 
Biafra in the eastern region led by Colonel Ojukwu and Yakubu Gowon's Nigerian federal 
government. The war was particularly poignant not solely because it attempted to break apart one 
of sub-Saharan' Africa's biggest nations, but also because of the global humanitarian response to 
the conflict and the dissemination of images of war and brutality around the globe. The Nigerian 
tactic of isolating the seceding Biafran state by taking its principal port town and sole access to the 
sea (Port Harcourt) in the military campaign of May 1968, perpetually land-locked the region. 
Biafra quickly became impoverished and overpopulated, facing serious threats of starvation and 
famine. This manoeuvre by the federal government was a key factor in the eventual surrender of 
Biafra on 15 January 1970 (Heerten& Dirk, 2014: 175-176).

Fifty-one years after the conflict, demands for the secession of South-eastern Nigeria to create the 
independent and sovereign state of Biafra have been reignited. In light of perceived ethno-
religious persecution targeting the Igbo people of the East and South-east via socioeconomic 
deprivation and political marginalisation, as well as the perceived lack of justice for the survivors 
and victims of the Nigerian government's starvation policy during the war, many Igbos within 
Nigeria and the diaspora have become very vocal about the need to carve out a separate Igbo state 
and bring to fruition the goals of Colonel Ojukwu and his Biafran forces during the civil war, 
leading to the creation of new pro-Biafran political groups such as the Movement for the 
Actualisation of Independent State of Biafra (MASSOB) in 1999 (Orji, 2017), and the Indigenous 
People of Biafra (IPOB). 

However, the general national aggression towards the agitations of these groups through the use 
of brute force against members and the dismissal of their concerns by branding them terrorist 
organisations (Kazeem, 2017) points to a larger and more insidious issue being the collective 
historical amnesia of Nigeria as a nation state and the underlying continuous process of national 
identity fragmentation.  

Consequently, this thesis will address the question: What explains the continued fragmentation in 
Nigeria's national identity today? It will argue that this fragmentation can be understood through 
the lens of trauma as a post-Biafra legacy. The research will in turn explore trauma as an 
international and national discourse on the question of genocide in Biafra, particularly focusing 
on the debates around semantics and the politics of labelling which that discourse produces. In 
addition, the research will address trauma as the intersection of a political and personal loss of a 

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Biafran imagined community and how this relates to rampant ethno-religious violence in the 
country.  

It goes without saying that there is a wealth of academic knowledge on the processes of the 
Nigeria-Biafra war and the build up to the conflict, however there has not been nearly enough 
emphasis on what it produced as its legacy. An emphasis on 'legacy' is precisely the focus of this 
project, as it becomes an attempt to tie together previously established academic discourse about 
the conflict as a post-colonial phenomenon, whilst moving towards a conversation on the 
ramifications of such violence and what that means within the context of nation-building and 
national identity formation in Nigeria today.  

The focus on trauma as legacy is of great value, in bridging the gap on historical discourse 
surrounding the war, but it brings the conflict back to a site of temporal relevance by suggesting 
that Nigeria's current issues with national fragmentation are not mutually exclusive from the war, 
rather the conflict can be viewed as an emphatic manifestation and an exacerbation of national 
identity rupture.  

(b) Marginalization and exclusion 

The Igbos have historically been marginalized in Nigerian politics, economy, and education, 
leading to feelings of exclusion and disenfranchisement. The Igbo race continues to face 
enormous political and economic challenges since the instigated and imposed civil war. A plain 
glance at the economic and political development in Nigeria may be considered normal in terms 
of where the Igbo people stand politically, especially economically when compared to other 
ethnic nationalities. Indeed a cursory look at the poverty level among the ethnic groups would 
make the Igbo race appear exceptionally successful. 

The Igbo people in reality experienced an overwhelming level of disadvantages based on public 
policies that seemed crafted to undermine their ability to maximize political and economic 
potentials. The restructuring of Nigeria to create more states for the northern states to the 
detriment of the Southern Nigeria, especially, the Southeast was not only an impediment 
politically; it impacts the economic potentials of the Igbo people negatively. Such policies as the 
failure to rehabilitate the Biafra land after the war, the 20 pounds flat refund to any Biafran who 
wished to convert the old currency, or deposits with banks prior to the war; the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972, also known as Indigenization Decree, Federal Character 
Principle, manipulated population census, creation of states and local government areas in favor 
of the Northern Nigeria, deliberate underuse of seaports within the Igbo axis, lack of standard 
international airport, and other exploitative actions. These formed many overt and indirect 
actions to diminish the ability of the Igbo people to compete on a level-playing ground with other 
major ethnic groups. 

Unlike today where some political actors will dare the Igbo people to vote against their 
aspirations, and perhaps, would still go ahead to win whether the Igbo people voted for them or 
not. It was not like that during the fight for the country's independence from the British colonial 
masters, and neither was that way during the first republic. The Eastern region used to play a very 
significant role politically in determining which parties collaborated to form a government. The 
National Council of Nigeria and Cameroun, which later changed to National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens (NCNC) under the leadership of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe partnered with the Northern 
People's Congress founded by Tafawa Balewa to form the government (University of Central 
Arkansas, 2019). Tafawa Balewa was appointed the Prime Minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe was 
made the Head of State (University of Central Arkansas, 2019). 

Economically, every region was autonomous, and developing at its pace's ability. The 

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Barnabas Ekiegini Izegede           He Socio-political Implications Of The Igbos's Indifferentism ...



Information Service (1956) reported that the Eastern region's economy was heavily dependent on 
palm produce, through which palm kernels were exported to earn foreign exchange, as well as 
palm frond is used for roofing, and palm wine for drinking. The Eastern region government 
promoted systematic agricultural economy, including farm settlements; cash crops such as 
rubber, cocoa, and palm grove scheme were established, creating an opportunity for people to 
earn a living through farming (Ministry of Commerce, 1966).

The coal industry was thriving under Nigeria Railway Corporation, and Nigersteel's rolling mill 
which produces mild steel bars were among only a few such operations in West Africa 
(Information Service, 1956). The NCNC led-government established a cement factory at 
Nkalagu, the Nigeria Breweries set up a stout factory at Aba, while in Port Harcourt, a Tobacco 
and glass making plant was sited there. “Oil mining in the region started by Shell D'Archy in 1937 
did not yield commercial quantities until 1957. But by 1965, oil was a promising source of 
income” (Van Buer, 1968, 23).

Having appraised the background to the phenomenon that prompted this study, the researcher 
will look at some of the antecedents of the Igbo people within the economic and political realm 
before 1967, and the prevailing condition in the present Nigeria. It is the hope of the researcher 
that the outcome of this study will be beneficial to the scholars, policymakers, and Nigerians, etc. 
as well as, add to the body of literature. 

INDIFFERENTISM: A COUNTER PROTEST OR POLITICAL REACTION? 

The Igbos' indifferentism may be perceived as a counter protest, signaling their disengagement 
from national initiatives. Alternatively, it could be a political reaction to the protest's perceived 
lack of inclusivity or addressing of Igbo-specific grievances which include: 

a. Lack of Rehabilitation after the Civil War 

General Gowon promised to rehabilitate and reintegrate the defunct Eastern region which its 
infrastructure was devastated during the civil war back to the country on equal footing, hence, the 
slogan: “No victor, no vanquished” (Gowon, 2014). In that spirit of oneness, General Gowon's 
military government decreed the policy of Reconciliation, Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation 
(3Rs) for the defeated Eastern region (Udeajah, 2017). The policies were merely cosmetic in 
since they were never actually carried out, while, such policy as the “abandoned property policy” 
was pursued vigorously (Obi-Ani, 2009). The consequence was not only economical, but a 
deliberate strategy designed to weaken the relationship between the Igbo people, and other 
minority ethnic groups of the Eastern region. 

b. Twenty Pounds Flat Fee Refund 

Several policies decreed into law became albatross of the Igbo nation's progress. Saro-Wiwa 
(2012) wrote that even though the Igbos were reintegrated into society, they continued to face 
economic discrimination. The £20 flat rate policy for any amount any Biafran who wishes to 
exchange his old currency was a deliberate policy to keep them from recovering from the 
economic devastation. Aduba (2017) argued in The Will newspaper, that Nigeria government 
deliberately imposed the £20 flat rate policy without any circumspection. 

c. Indigenization Decree 

The promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972, also known as 
Indigenization Decree, was not done with the accommodation of Igbo interest. The government 
enacted the policy when the Igbo people were at the weakest economic point just after they have 
emerged from the civil war (Obi-Ani, 2009). The implication was that the other ethnic groups 

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were able to participate in purchasing shares of those blue-chip companies that the Nigeria 
government decided to appropriate. 

d. Manipulated Population Census 

There were several instances of the Nigeria census exercises found to be less than desirable. The 
need to maintain a very high population figure advantage by certain regions over the others was 
intense. That notwithstanding, even the demographers found the 1973 population census 
incredibly manipulated (Metz, 1991). The census exercise confirmed that Nigeria's population 
grew by 44 percent in 10 years, while, Northern Nigeria's population jumped to 64 percent 
compared to 53.7 percent in 1963 (Metz, 1991). The bloated population advantage has 
consequences for the creation of states, local governments, and the sharing of accrued revenues at 
the center since, in practice, Nigeria runs a unitary system as against the federal system on paper. 

e. Federal Character Principle 

Federal Character principle is enshrined in the 1999 Constitution, but its first introduction was the 
1979 Constitution. Section 14 (3) and (4) of the 1999 Constitution provide for the equitable 
distribution of positions in the military, paramilitary, police, all other security institutions, public 
service, parastatals, and publicly owned companies (Constitution of the Federal Republic, 1999). 
The plain accommodation of the principle as it ought to be applied has not always worked 
according to the dictates of the constitution, primarily, when it comes to placing the Igbo people in 
certain positions. The President Buhari's administration has been the worst offender that he had 
been called out for his insensitivity to other ethnic groups when making appointments. According 
to Senator Abaribe, the incumbent Nigeria's President, General Buhari has willfully ensured that 
the Southeast zone was not included in the National Defence Council and the National Security 
Council (Busari, 2018). 

f. Creation of States and Local Government Areas 

The creation of states and local government areas were deliberately made to favor Northern 
Nigeria. The Southeast zone is the only political zone among the six political zones that has only 
five states, while, the rest of the other zones have six states each (Aribisala, 2015) [  . Aribisa1a 18]
concluded that this has consequently led to Southeast being the only zone with the least amount of 
revenue allocation in the Federation. Former Governor of Anambra state, Dr Ezeife, and Olu 
Falae, the former Secretary to the Government of the Federation argued that the creation of more 
states and local governments in favor of the Northern states was an injustice against their zones, 
Southeast and Southwest, respectively (Kalu, 2017; Eya, 2017). 

Both writers observed that the injustice argued by Ezeife and Falae is based on the lopsided size of 
revenue allocations from the federal government that goes to the northern states. Olu Falae 
pointed out that Lagos state which is densely populated, used to have a uniform number of local 
governments (precisely 20 LGAs) with Kano state (Eya, 2017). Falae argues that while Lagos has 
been made to retain the same number of local government areas, Kano has grown to 77 LGAs. 
The Kano state in 1991 was divided into two states, with Jigawaas the new state out of the old 
Kano state (Adisa, 2011). It is not only the lopsided revenue allocations being channeled to the 
northern region that is perceived as injustices, but the political inequities acutely manifest in 
addressing the national issues. Take, for example, Nwabufo (2019) who highlights that in “In 
2015, the south-east had no representation in the leadership of all the arms of government. This 
was rationalized at the time with a bogus claim, 'the zone did not produce any ranking senator or 
member of the house of representatives on the platform of the APC” (para. 7). The interests of the 
Southeast are never adequately protected because the states and LGAs created by military fiat to 
the detriment of Southeast hollows their ability to be effective. The enumerated consequences of 

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Barnabas Ekiegini Izegede           He Socio-political Implications Of The Igbos's Indifferentism ...

https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=94036


States and LGAs creations were some of the reasons for the call to restructure Nigeria. 

g. Deliberate Underuse of Seaports 

There is a well-considered perception that the seaports within the Igbo axis are deliberately 
underused when one considers the fact that Port Harcourt port was a bustling port prior to Nigeria 
independence, up until Nigeria Biafra civil war to (Information Service, 1956). The Port Harcourt 
port was the second largest port in the country commissioned in 1913 as with Lagos port (Nimasa 
e-library, n.d). The Calabar port was equally busy handling exports and imports. 

Today, Nigeria's Lagos seaports are fully congested; lives of residents, business owners, and 
motorists are impacted negatively due to conditions at the ports. The Pointer (2019) observed that 
“a recent report based on estimates by terminal operators has it that more than 2 million twenty 
tons equivalent units (TEUs) of laden containers are awaiting clearance at Lagos seaports” (para. 
1) . The Lagos ports handle over 80 percent of the cargoes that enter the country (The Pointer). In 
spite of these problems, the federal government had refused to dredge the river Niger, improve the 
Calabar and Warri ports, etc., or make it friendly to use Port Harcourt to ease the economic waste 
arising from the concentration of activities in Lagos ports. 

h. Lack of International Airport 

The Igbo people are found in every nook and cranny of Nigeria, and virtually, in all parts of the 
world. The Igbo people are constantly on the move, both domestically and internationally. Most 
of the times, they must travel to Lagos or Abuja, before they could connect any direct 
international flights. It was in 2013 that the President Good luck administration completed the 
facilities at Enugu airport, now Akanu Ibiam International airport, which enabled the first 
international flight led by Prince Arthur Eze (Edike, 2013). He said on arrival at Enugu airport: 
“Look at me, I flew from Senegal to Enugu for four hours non-stop. I don't need to go to Lagos or 
Abuja to catch direct flight again to Europe or Senegal. I can now go from my house to any place 
of choice” (Edike, 2013). 

It is worth noting that the Federal government has not invested in upgrading the facilities at Enugu 
airport to international airport status. The runways are very bumpy without the approach lights; 
there are no water supplies, the cooling systems are not working, etc. (Mikairu and Agbo, 2019). 
The Southeast governors have raised the alarm about the state of the airport, and why the contract 
that had been awarded for the airport by the present government has not reflected at the airport 
(Mikairu and Agbo, 2019). 

The federal government has recently announced that it will shut down the airport for security 
reasons (Aliyu, 2019). The announcement was not well received by the people of Southeast both 
on the chat rooms and mainstream media. The Ohanaeze Ndigbo asked the government not to 
embark on such action as the timing is not right, and it will impact negatively on the development 
of the Igbo economy (Olokor, 2019). Mr Chiedozie Orizu, the spokesperson for Ohanaze Youth 
leader, Arthur Obiora, advised the federal government that such move will not augur well for the 
development of the Igbo land (Okeke, 2019). There had not been anything to show that the 
contract award for the Enugu airport has reflected on it yet. 

i. Other Impediments 

Other impediments are directed against the Igbo people. Some of the barriers are excessive police 
checkpoints directed against the Igbo people and businesses, and Customs personnel harassment 
of Igbo people's business interests. The use of touts to harass and collect illegal levies from the 
Igbo shops with the active support of some politicians in places such as Lagos state. 

The Igbo people suffer excessive extortion and harassment at the ubiquitous police checkpoints 

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both within their homeland and routes leading to the Southeast. The harassment is more intense 
during the festive periods when the people of Southeast visit their families (Okolie, 2017). Mr. 
Peter Obi, the former Governor of Anambra, state condemned the activities of the Customs on the 
highway, particularly, on roads leading to Igbo heartland, where he observed numerous Customs 
checkpoints from Ore to Onitsha (Olowookere, 2016). The extortion by the Customs on 
containers that had been cleared at the ports on roads leading to the Southeast calls to question the 
Buhari's professed fight against corruption (NAN, 2016). 

MISTRUST FOR NATIONAL UNITY 

Between 1960 and 2008 Nigeria has been characterized by social inequities in the distribution of 
power and resources. These inequities, which are rooted in the foundation of the Nigerian state 
led to a civil war in 1967 in which the Igbo, one of the major ethnic groups sought to secede from 
Nigeria. But the attempt was not successful. The war was followed by a number of systematic and 
calculated policies, which the victors used to keep the Igbo people down and to hegemonise their 
grip of political domination of Nigeria for a long time in both the Nigerian military and civilian 
rules.  The  widened democratic  space  in  1999  gave  rise  to  a  renewed  expression  of  
resentment  by  Igbo  youths  whose rejection of their post-war socio-political and economic 
repressions have sparked off the emergence of youth based movements. Thus, nationalism 
resurgence is manifested in the renewed demand for Biafra by these organizations.  They  elicited  
responses  from  the  democratic  government,  which  seemed  to have  relapsed  to  the  old  
order  of  military  style  of  violent  repression  of  dissension  that  end  up  as counter  
productive.  Through the processing of primary  data,  this  paper examines  the reinvention  of 
Igbo nationalism in eastern Nigeria. The paper looks at its linkage with the 1999 democratic 
transition in Nigeria, the implications of this development and the management of the issue by the 
government.  

Deep  rooted  ethnic  grievances  and  rivalry  among  the major Nigerian  ethnic groups had  
accompanied the politics  of  decolonization,  culminating in  the first  attempt at Igbo  
ethnonationalism  expressed  in  the  declaration  of the Biafran Republic in 1967.  This attempt 
at  secession was crushed by the Nigerian state after a cruel three year war that resulted in the loss 
of over one million lives and displacement of many others in eastern Nigeria. The end of the war 
was followed by deliberate social, political and economic policies aimed at  reducing  the  
capacity  of  the Igbo  people  to  challenge  the state  or the  dominance  of the victorious groups. 
These  policies  of  marginalization  were  efficiently  and effectively  carried  out through  the  
autocratic  military  regimes  that  dominated  Nigerian  politics  for  the  greater proportion  of  
its post-war  history that  spanned  between 1970  till  1999.  The  transition  into  a democratic  
dispensation  has  coincided with  the  emergence of  a  post-war Igbo  generation  who  do  not  
accept  the  professed  marginalization of the Igbos in Nigeria. The manifestation is  seen  in  the  
number  of  groups  and  movements  that have emerged to demand for the resuscitation of the 
defunct Biafran state as  a panacea  to the alienation  of the Igbos  in the  Nigerian  polity.  This 
new Igbo nationalism like any other nationalism is a politicized ethnicity, which often develops 
when an ethnic group manifests a political agenda (Joireman, 2003). For Hobsbawn (1990), 
nationalism comes before  nation, in the  sense  that an ethnic group  must  be  somehow  
politically  mobilized  before  it becomes a nation. The political mobilization occurs in the form 
of some sort of recognized collective objectives as perceived by an ethnic group that feels 
marginalized in a heterogeneous society. Joireman (2003) had argued that nationalism is 
intensified by the politics of exclusion.  So any time  a group  of people  in a  multi-national  
polity feel particularly targeted for ill-treatment or oppression,  there is  the  likelihood  that  their  

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Barnabas Ekiegini Izegede           He Socio-political Implications Of The Igbos's Indifferentism ...



identification  will  turn  from ethnic to national identity as it becomes politicized.  

When a group in a society is marked out for unequal treatment, either economically or politically, 
then the boundaries of that group become clearly defined. The origin of Igbo nationalism started 
with the quest for an independent Biafran state which extends back to four decades ago.  That 
quest  can  be  aptly  situated  in  the politics of decolonization in Nigeria that saw to a gradual 
constitutional evolution  by relatively orderly processes of conferences  and  negotiations,  
culminating  in  the  independence of Nigeria from British colonialism in 1960.  

The hiccups that were associated with these processes, gave  rise  to  the  structure  of 
constitutional  agreements that collapsed shortly after independence following a military  coup  
in  January  1966;  the  army  was  broken  into regional groups after a counter coup in July of 
same year thus precipitating series of actions and events before the outbreak  of  the  civil  war.  At  
this  point  citizens  of  the former Eastern region origin had fled from the rest of the country 
during a series of massacre known as pogrom in Nigeria  that  produced  a  migration  of  
hundreds of  thou-sands  of  persons  as  never  witnessed  in  the  country before.  As Nixon  
(1972) noted, the  central  government lost  its  effective  authority  over  the  Eastern  region  and 
following a breakdown of the orderly process of negotiations,  the  Eastern  region  sought  its  
own  security  and survival by declaring its independence shortly after which the central 
government sought to re-establish its authority in the area by military action. The result was the 
bitter war that lasted for almost three years and with over a million casualties from military action, 
disease and starvation.  

The  conflict  was  ended  with  the  collapse  of  Biafra  in January 1970,  as  the immediate 
issues of  the  war were resolved  in  favor  of  Nigeria  under  the  Federal  Military Government  
that  subsequently  declared  the  war  as  no victor,  no  vanquished.  The  re-entry  of  the  former  
Biafrans, dominantly of the Igbo ethnic  group into  the Nigerian  society  was  phenomenal  in  
the  annals  of  group integration. This was the situation, until the emergence of MASSOB  in  
1999  re-opening  the  issue  of  Biafra  and working  towards  its  actualization.  For  a  better  
understanding of the  genesis of  Igbo nationalism, it is imperative to highlight graphic details of 
the events that have led to  the  present  situation  under  discussion.  Nixon (1972) had chronicled 
the distinctive circumstances that led to the first declaration of Biafra in May 1967. According  to 
him,  the  Biafran  claim  to  independence  began  in  May 1966, following  a series of attacks  
targeted against  peoples of  Eastern region living  in the  north  of Nigeria.  

The attacks were followed by the coup of 29 July 1966, during which  Nigerian  troops  of  
northern  origin  systematically killed about 240 southern  officers  and  men,  of  whom  at least  
three  quarters  were  easterners  and  leading to  the emergence of  Lieutenant Colonel  Yakubu 
Gowon as the Supreme  Commander  to  replace  General  Aguiyi Ironsi, an ethnic Igbo affected 
by the mutiny. This action destroyed the Nigerian army as an effective  agent  of  Nigerian  unity  
as  well  as  the  unity  of  the command  because Lieutenant  Colonel  Odumegwu Ojukwu,  who  
was  the  Military  Governor of  the  Eastern  Region, did not recognize  Gowon  as  the  rightful  
person  to  assume the position of supreme commander.  

The  subsequent  massacre  of  citizens  of  the  Eastern region in the north, starting again in 
September 1966 and the mass migration back to the east that ensued widened the  rupture  in  
national  unity.  It  was  at  this  point  that issues such as problems of refugees, economic support  
of  displaced  persons  and intensified  fears of  citizens of the Eastern  region  for their  personal 
safety combined to escalate  the  tension  between  the  Eastern  region  and central government. 
Nixon (1972) remarks that none of the  series of efforts to find a peaceful basis for renewed 

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cooperation between the Eastern region and the center yielded fruit, but it was rather  series  of  
unilateral  moves  in  areas  of  economic and political relations by both the East and the center 
that worsened  the  conflict  until  the  Eastern  region  trans-formed into  Biafran Republic by 
proclaiming its  independence on 30 May 1967. In a bid to stop this secessionist move,  the  
central  government  opened  a  military  action against  the  East on  July  5,  1967. This  action  
was  pro- longed  till  15  January  1970 when  the resistance  by  the Biafran rebels caved in 
leading  to victory for the unity of Nigeria.  The  victory  created  the  condition  for  the  re-
absorption  of the  citizens  of  the defunct  Biafra  into  the Nigerian  society  as  Nigerians,  
rendering  the  quest  for  Biafra  completely  a  forgotten  matter amidst  for  the time being.  This  
re-entry came  with  assurances  of  the victorious  federal  side  that the  war  ended in  a  no 
victor,  no vanquished designation, but post-war events indicate that the former  Biafrans 
particularly  the dominant  Igbo ethnic group were reabsorbed into Nigeria as conquered people 
(Amadiume, 2000).

It was this scenario that created conditions for the cries of  marginalization  by the  Igbos,  in  their  
struggle for  full insertion  into  the  post-war  Nigerian society.  Onu (2003) notes  that  the  
resurgence  of Igbo  nationalism  which  is spearheaded by MASSOB, a youthful and radical 
organization of succeeding  generations of  Igbo who fought the civil war, is a result of their 
frustration in the Nigerian entity and perception that  the existing political  structure that seeming  
consign  the  Igbos  to  a  lower  status  than  it deserves  vis-à-vis  other  groups  is  illegitimate.  
Several documented facts supports this view, no wonder the cries of marginalization have been 
loudest from them.  Ikpeze (2000) in an attempt  to establish that the Igbos in  post-war  Nigeria  
were  marginalized,  articulated four  clear dimensions this  marginalization has manifested; 
economic strangulation,  politico-bureaucratic  emasculation, military neutralization and 
ostracism.  

Some  of  the  issues that  readily  come to  mind  include the  20  pounds  ceiling  placed  on  
bank  lodgments  for every Igbo after the war no matter  how  much  such  persons had in banks. 
This has been interpreted as a calculated policy to neutralize the savings and capacity of the Igbos 
to rehabilitate and re-integrate into the Nigerian economy (Ikpeze, 2000; Ojukwu, 2005). Related 
to this is the sudden withdrawal of federal  troops from the east, a ploy  that  was  aimed  at  
denying  the Igbo  economy  the stimulus  for  recovery  as  Igbo  people  who  could  have been 
empowered as suppliers to the troops were denied the opportunity. Also was the timing of the 
indigenization policy which  came  shortly  after  the  war  when  the  Igbos were  financially  
constrained  to participate,  thereby  incapacitating  the  Igbos  economically.  Of  note  in  
postwar Igbo  marginalization  was  the  deficient  infrastructural development  in  their  
homeland  resulting  in  the  mass migration  of  the Igbos  to other  areas of  the country  for 
economic  survival.  There  were  also  cases  of  discrimination  against  the  Igbos  in  the  
location  of  industries and the  attendant  loss of benefits  of  linkages that come from such  
locations. Also worthy of mention, is the deliberate neglect of ecological problems in the east, 
especially the problem of soil erosion that results in the loss of agricultural lands and settlements.   

The  ecological  devastation  becomes obvious in relative terms when compared with the massive 
attention given to desertification in the north and beach  erosion  in  the  western  parts  of  
Nigeria (Ikpeze, 2000). Apart from these policies that economically disempowered the  Igbos,  
other instruments were  also  used to effectively  exclude  them  from  economic  and  political 
power at  the  centre.  Such include the 'tokenist' appointments to strategically insignificant 
positions in administrations, marginal presence in the administration and headship of ministerial 
and extraministerial departments and parastatals. Also worthy of note  is the  distortions  of the 
federal structure to the  disadvantage of  the Igbos, such that  the zone  has  the least  number  of 

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Barnabas Ekiegini Izegede           He Socio-political Implications Of The Igbos's Indifferentism ...



states  and  local  governments compared to the other major tribes, implying smaller  resources  
and  representation,  because  number  of states and local government areas are the main basis for 
resource  allocation  and  representation  at  the  federal level. 

Furthermore,  the  indifferent  response  of  the  federal authorities  and  even  governments  of  
other  states  to uphold  the  constitutionally  inviolable  natural  residency and citizenship rights 
of original Igbo owners as far as the issue of 'abandoned  property' of the Igbos  who fled the 
pogrom  and  war  is  also  mentioned.  Aware of the role Nigerian military officers of Igbo 
extraction played in the Biafran armed forces, there was a policy to ensure under representation of 
the Igbos in the military. Re-absorption after the war was negligible, for the few that were 
reabsorbed, rate of upward mobility were very slow aimed at preventing the resurgence of the 
Igbos militarily. Related  to this is the virtual exclusion of Igbo land from highest sensitive  
military  facilities  of  such  important  installation  as mechanized division  or  armories. The  
predicament of  post-war  Igbo in  Nigeria  is a  perception  that is  widely held  by members of  
the ethnic group  and its  capacity to culminate into negative reactions may have been bottled up  
due  to the hold on to power by the military.  

For  close  to  thirty  years  after  that  war,  the  major  pre-occupation of the  Igbos was  how to 
be  fully reintegrated into  the  Nigerian  society  and  possibly  attain  the  pre-eminent position  
as  a power  bloc  which  the  people  had tried to construct prior to the war and thus end the cry of 
marginalization  (Igbokwe,  2005). However, all through this period, there were no recognizable 
groups that have agitated for the resuscitation of the Biafran Republic as it seemed a forgotten 
affair publicly. After the war till 1990s, the  major  public  discourse  centered  on how  the  Igbos, 
the major  ethnic  group  in  the  Biafran  rebellion  could  be accepted  back  fully  as  
participants  in  Nigerian  political process. But democratic transition in 1999 seems to have 
created  the  space  for  the  renewed  expression  of  Igbo nationalism as it marked the beginning 
of emergence into the scene of organizations and movements calling for the resuscitation of  the  
defunct Biafran Republic.  Generated from  the  above  are  some  pertinent  questions;  why  is 
there  a  renewed demand  for Biafra,  thirty-years  after  a similar  move  was  crushed?  Who are 
the people behind the organizations spearheading these agitations?  How much do they know 
about the war that was fought in the past and what are the impacts of memories of the former war 
in this new demand?  Does  this  renewed  agitation have  solid  social bases  or is  it  a ploy  by 
Igbo  elites to achieve  a  greater  stake  in  Nigerian  politics?  All these, form the major thrust of 
this paper in an attempt to create insights into political imbalances in Nigeria that has remained a 
major crises of Nigerian development since the 1960's.  

SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 

Inequalities (socio-economic) among the various ethnic groups as orchestrated by a long period 
of colonial administration (1860-1960) have made Nigeria a cynosure of ethnic conflicts. The 
central issue is that the social formation of Nigeria which is basically ethnically heterogeneous 
and by implication a multi-cultural society may result in a high potentiality for lack of cordiality, 
mutual suspicion and fear and in addition a high tendency towards violent confrontation for 
various sociopolitical reasons. Ethnic conflict has arisen out of this context of mutual fear and 
suspicion over distribution of socio-political and economic goods and lack of cordiality. Thus, the 
inability of every ethnic group to access socio-political and economic goods continues to impact 
negatively on the force of national integration and cohesion. It is a product of the long history of 
unequal access to power, resources and opportunities among the different ethnic groups in the 
country.  

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Thus, the demands of such a challenge are exacting. Significantly, this context has led to open 
confrontation and conflict because the stressful condition of the body polity raised questions that 
challenge the very basis on which the political community – modern Nigeria – is organized. This 
prompts the question, 'is ethnicity in Nigeria an invention of the people or of colonialism?' What 
raises this question is the fact that the various ethnic groups that constitute the pre- Nigeria state 
once co-existed socially and economically, hence the question of whether ethnicity is a social 
construct or a natural order? Through the division of the country into six geo-political zones, all 
the major ethnic groups are now found within these zones along with the minority ethnic groups, 
as Arowolo, D. (2011) has put it, the re-engineering of the country into six zones has made the 
minority groups in the country to cluster around the major ethnic groups, thus giving the country a 
tripartite ethnic structure. By implication, the mobilization for socio-political contest still 
revolved around the major ethnic groups. Invariably, this has made it possible for the politics of 
exclusion to persist even to the detriment of the minorities, which has resulted in conflict over the 
demand for such rights as well as underdevelopment of the polity. 

The foundation for the politics of exclusion was laid by the construction of the Nigerian political 
environment around the three major ethnic groups which saw this as an opportunity to exert their 
hegemonic power over the rest of the country. “Fragment of a democracy: Reflections on class 
and politics in Nigeria” opines that the Nigerian regional political elites within the frame work of 
regional politics see democracy as a mechanism through which political power can be gained or 
distributed together with economic power and the social status that follows. It could be reasoned 
that right from the beginning the minorities have always been sidelined within the polity. Or 
better still the regional political leaders contributed to the ethnic conflict in the country through 
the consolidation of each ethnic group's main political parties which was equally evident in the 
Second Republic. 

Thus, politics in Nigeria before and after independence was used as an ethnic weapon to the 
detriment of the minorities in the country. It became a game between the majorities where the 
distributive resources were under their control with the minorities significantly excluded from the 
mainstream of governance. That is, they are given positions only to solicit for their political 
support and not as forces to be reckoned with in the political game. This situation provided 
leverage for ethnic identity as well as politics of exclusions to thrive. Without mincing words this 
has been a challenge to the unity of Nigeria or the survival of Nigeria as a state; given the plurality 
of Nigeria state. 

In the present political dispensation, efforts are being made by civil society to consolidate the 
hard won democracy through its various intervention activities on issues of human rights, 
electoral reforms, constitutional reform, gender equality, civic education, transparency and 
accountability. The efforts of civil society to promote good governance are likely to remain futile 
as long as the problems of unemployment, corruption, political apathy, and people oriented 
constitution and the like are not addressed. This is because civil society has put Nigeria in a 
market place of idea and ideologies, the essence of which is to propel healthy competition 
towards national integration, growth and development. This has made civil society an 
indispensable tool in the consolidation of socio-political development due to the fact that citizens 
can actualize their goals through their operations in the state. 

CONCLUSION 

Ethnicity in Nigeria, no doubt, has been a significant challenge to the socio-political development 
of the country; not because the phenomenon is in itself dangerous but that the tendency is for 

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Barnabas Ekiegini Izegede           He Socio-political Implications Of The Igbos's Indifferentism ...



political leaders to manipulate it. Thus, the functionality of ethnicity can either be negative or 
positive. Ethnicity can be problematic if not managed properly and at the same time, a highly 
rewarding phenomenon if well managed, which means that ethnicity will continue to remain a 
force to be reckoned with notwithstanding the strategic mechanisms adopted to diffuse its flame. 
The historical context of Igbo indifferentism reveals a complex web of socio-political factors that 
contributed to their stance. The legacy of the Biafran War, as well as marginalization, exclusion, 
ethnic tensions, and unaddressed grievances, have fostered a deep-seated mistrust of the Nigerian 
state. The effects of military takeover, including human rights abuses, displacement, and 
economic hardship, have further entrenched this mistrust. The socio-political implications of 
Igbo indifferentism for national unity are significant. Their disconnection from national 
initiatives and lack of investment in Nigerian politics undermine efforts towards a unified nation. 
To address this, it is essential to: 

i. Acknowledge and address historical grievances 

ii. Promote inclusive governance and representation 

iii. Ensure human rights protection and accountability

iv. Foster ethnic harmony and dialogue 

v. 	 Encourage economic development and 
empowerment 

By taking these steps, Nigeria can work towards rebuilding trust and promoting national unity. 

Indeed, the Igbos' indifferentism serves as a reminder of the need for a more inclusive and 
equitable society where all ethnic groups feel valued and represented. Only then can Nigeria hope 
to achieve true national unity and prosperity.  

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